SAVANNAH CHATHAM METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT – CORRUPTION

During interviews of lA personnel it was often said that CNT should have taken care of its own disciplinary problems at the time they manifested themselves. But the organizational structure interfered with that. CNT operates in a task force environment and during the time under review was working cases jointly with DEA. Because Khaalis and Willet Williams were suspected of activities that could have been criminal in nature, decisions were taken to delay administrative action so as not to compromise the criminal investigation. If Director Harris had had the authority to terminate Khaalis, he may have done so. But he had no such authority under the CNT charter. Eventually, when it was determined there would be no criminal prosecutions, the Khaalis and Williams matters were turned over to SCMPD lA., who gave evidence of being resentful from the beginning.

Because integrity is the glue that holds highly cohesive organizations such as police departments together, law enforcement agencies have traditionally recognized the extreme importance of having internal affairs elements which are recognized as being impartial, unrelenting, but fair. It is essential that lA investigations be seen as thorough, open minded and timely. None of that seems to have occurred here. As has been noted earlier, the investigation was pending for more than five months; practically no work at all is evident from the record after day number two; compelling evidence was disparaged and dismissed; no information was independently developed by lA; Khaalis was brought back from Administrative Leave by Chief Lovett three months before the lA report was finalized; the Letter of Transmittal covering the final report was prepared by lA itself, an aberration from normal procedure; Khaalis’ superior SCMPD officer at CNT was never contacted by lA and never given an opportunity to review the report or prepare recommendations; the LOT falsely stated that the information that formed the basis for the repmi had been reviewed by the City Attorney’s Office; Khaalis and Williams were exonerated due to a failure of the allegations by the FBI and CNT to prove any violations of policy; and, finally, the three officers who had been the backbone of the James Williams and Josh Varner cases and who had participated in the investigation of Khaalis were transferred out of CNT by what has been characterized as an unusual special order of Chief Lovett. One of these officers is still with SCMPD. One has taken law enforcement employment elsewhere. One has taken his own life. Khaalis has been promoted to Sergeant and Willet Williams remains a Star Corporal.

Finally, whether because of personal animosity with the CNT Director, failure to understand the seriousness of the issues involved, reluctance to take decisive action or any number of other possible reasons, Chief Willie Lovett failed m this matter to provide the strong and moral leadership demanded by his rank and position.

IV. Findings

In inquiries such as this, bringing absolute clarity to the issues at hand is rarely achievable. Individual recollections ofevents often differ; and this may be due to personal agendas, perceptions of self interest, or simply faulty memories. Similarly, cettain actions can be undisputed, but it may be impossible to impute with certainty the motives behind such actions. And records may establish beyond any doubt that two parties were in telephonic contact, while the substance of any conversation can never be known.

All this is by way of saying that MDBI has not been able to arrive at any significant findings that meet the criminal (“beyond a reasonable doubt”) standard. But by employing what MDBI considers to be the more appropriate “preponderance ofthe evidence” standard (a reasonable person determines there is a better than even chance that a proposition is true), numerous relevant findings become possible. Key among these is as follows:

I. As early as 2008 Khaalis was aware that an informant had provided information that James Williams claimed to have a brother who was a police officer and who was “in his pocket”. Khaalis, by his own admission, knew that this police officer was Willet Williams.

2. At this point Khaalis knew and had contact with Willett Williams, but never made mention of this fact to his CNT colleagues or supervisors.
3. Once a criminal case was opened on James and Willet Williams by CNT, the case officer specifically asked the investigative team, to include Khaalis, if anyone knew Willet. Even at this point Khaalis declined to reveal his association with Willet Williams.
4. During an April 16, 2009 surveillance of James Williams, Khaalis suggested a contact with Willet, but was told by the case officer not to establish such contact.
5. Despite these instructions, Khaalis had seven telephonic contacts with Willet Williams during the surveillance ofJames Williams.
6. Khaalis never told anyone of his contacts with Willet Williams on this occasion, but later made attempts to ascertain if Willet’s toll records would be subpoenaed.
7. Khaalis deceitfully withheld critical information from his CNT superiors and colleagues proceeded against the instructions of the case officer and/or surveillance leader and probably provided case-related information to a subject of the investigation.
8. When the toll records of Willet Williams were examined it was determined that not only did he have repeated contact with Khaalis during the Apri116 surveillance, he subsequently had three telephonic contacts with his brother, James, at precisely the time that James was exhibiting alerted behavior. MDBI believes it likely that James was given surveillance-related information by Willet during these contacts.
9. On January 27,2010 Khaalis attended a minimization briefing at CNT concerning the initiation of a wiretap on Josh Varner. Immediately after the briefing Khaalis disappeared from the “wire room”, even though he was assigned to the monitoring shift. The first intercepted incoming call warned Varner to discontinue use of his phone.
10. Two subsequent attempts to wiretap Varner failed in a similar fashion. Khaalis was a member of the monitoring team on these occasions.
11. A fourth wiretap was run out of the DEA office without Khaalis’ knowledge and this time sufficient information was obtained to secure an indictment.
12. When the fourth wiretap was moved back to the CNT wire room with Khaalis as a monitor, Varner promptly discontinued use of his phone.
13. It is considered likely that Khaalis either personally or through a third party warned Varner that his phone was being tapped.
14. On February 13, 20 I 0 Khaalis was assigned as a monitor in the wiretap of Hezekiah Murdock when a call was intercepted arranging for a meeting between Murdock and a female. Khaalis left the wire room without permission and caused traffic stop of the female, thus jeopardizing the investigation.
15. When questioned by his supervisor, Khaalis said that he had discussed the traffic stop with the case officer. The case officer later denied he had been contacted by Khaalis prior to the stop. Khaalis subsequently admitted to his supervisor he had not spoken with the case officer and had no explanation for saying he had.
16. Khaalis lied to his supervisor, left his place of assignment without required permission, violated standard operating procedure by taking pro-active enforcement activity without the required permission of his supervisor and/or the case officer, and put a sensitive investigation at risk.
17. On numerous occasions Khaalis attempted to access information concerning subjects of active investigations to which he had no right under standard CNT policies.
18. On numerous occasions Khaalis violated or attempted to violate standard CNT procedures concerning the handling ofcell phones seized during the course ofarrests.
19. On April 2, 2010 Khaalis received a scripted telephone call from a cooperating DEA source regarding an impending drug-related money transaction. He lied to colleagues, saying he was going home to eat and then drove to the scene of the supposed transaction with no notification to his supervisor.
20. On June 9, 2010 Khaalis showed deception on an FBI polygraph examination on the issues of whether he had warned Willet Williams that his brother, James, was under CNT investigation and whether he had used his position to protect anyone involved in illegal drug trafficking activity.
21. In July 2010 the FBI informed SCMPD that it would never again work a case with SCMPD where Khaalis would be a potential witness.
22. In May, 2013 the District Attorney for Georgia’s Eastern Judicial Circuit informed SCMPD that her office would not prosecute any cases where Khaalis or Willet Williams were involved.
23. In February, 2009 a source ofundetermined reliability, but who had provided reliable information in the past, tentatively identified Willet Williams as the individual in police uniform who escotted him and another individual from the scene oftwo drug transactions.
24. The drug transactions took place at the residence o f James Williams, brother of Willet.
25. There is no evidence that Willet Williams came to the scene oftraffic stop involving James Williams for the purpose of improperly exe1ting influence on behalf of James.
26. In 2008 Willet Williams improperly received federal rent subsidy money, but was eventually not prosecuted either federally or locally for fraud in deference to the fact that he made full restitution. There is insufficient evidence to establish that Williams knowingly perpetrated fraud.
27. In connection with the above, Williams belligerently confronted the Director of the Savannah Housing Authority, threatening to see her in court. Chief Berkow told the Director Williams had been reprimanded for his behavior. No record of such a reprimand was found on the record, although the record does indicate two reprimands for conduct unbecoming an officer in 2007.
28. Statements from numerous individuals as well as review of available documentation establish that Willet Williams has a reputation for intemperate behavior in his dealings with the public.
29. During its five and one half month investigation, lA conducted two interviews, took one written statement, attended three briefings and briefed Chief Lovett on two or possibly three occasions.
30. lA dismissed toll record information as being irrelevant based on inexplicably poor analysis.
31. IA was apparently never given a detailed memorandum and report prepared by CNT Director Roy Harris concerning the questionable activities of Khaalis and Williams. (Said report having been hand-delivered to Chief Lovett.)
32. lA acted totally at variance with established SCMPD policy and procedure by preparing a Letter of Transmittal recommending closure o f the IA case with a finding of unsustained allegations against Khaalis and Williams.
33. The LOT made the inexplicable statement that the information provided by the FBI and CNT proved no violations of SCMPD policy as well as the false statement that the information obtained had been reviewed by the City Attorney’s Office which made a finding of no illegal activity.
34. While no evidence of improper influence on lA was discovered, their handling of this entire matter was negligent and unprofessional.
35. On the few occasions that Chief Lovett was briefed by IA he was assured that the evidence against Khaalis and Williams was thin and inconclusive and that the FBI and CNT refused to provide documentation of their allegations.
36. Shortly after his last briefing by IA on July 27,2010, Chief Lovett ordered that Khaalis be returned to active duty.
37. In early September, 20I0 Chief Lovett was given a detailed briefing in his office by the CNT Director, the US Attorney and the FBI regarding the Khaalis/Williams matter.
38. In early October, 2010 Chief Lovett was personally handed a detailed report prepared by the CNT Director regarding the Khaalis/Williams investigation.
39. Chief Lovett never forwarded this repott to IA for their review and consideration.
40. In November Chief Lovett, in opposition to SOP, instructed !A Captain Hank Wiley to prepare a LOT recommending exoneration of Khaalis and Williams, falsely saying thatthe material received from the FBI and CNT had been reviewed by the City Attorney’sOffice and that there was no evidence ofpolicy violations.
41. 41. Chief Lovett’s performance in the Khaalis/Williams matter, whether by design or negligence, was inadequate and unprofessional. Despite the fact that he was given ample information both orally and in writing to make a reasoned disciplinary decision regarding these two men, he chose to consider only a single page surveillance log. He also withheld vital information from lA; truncated the standard procedure for handling lA reports; and instructed lA to prepare a LOT with patently false and incorrect information.
42. 42. No evidence was found of improper activity by Cleveland Lovett in the matter of his nephew’s arrest by Officer Kendall Brown nor was evidence found of retaliation against Brown by Lovett.

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